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Uta Frith has made a major contribution to our understanding of developmental disorders, especially
autism and dyslexia. She has studied the cognitive and neurobiological bases of both disorders and
demonstrated distinctive impairments in social cognition and central coherence in autism, and in pho-
nological processing in dyslexia. In this enterprise she has encouraged psychologists to work in a
theoretical framework that distinguishes between observed behaviour and the underlying cognitive
and neurobiological processes that mediate that behaviour.
Early academic biography
Imagine a world without computers, printers,
pocket calculators, or photocopiers. A world in
which the dominant view was that autism was
caused by “refrigerator parents”, and the concept
of developmental dyslexia was regarded as a self-
serving invention of the middle classes. Into such
a world came the young Uta Aurnhammer, fresh
from the University of Saarbru ¨cken in Germany,
where she had been seduced away from her orig-
inal plan to study art history by the discovery of
psychology as an experimental science. Her inter-
est was immediately engaged by the realization
that the study of the mind need not rely on mere
introspection or dictat, but could be researched
using empirical methods, with hypotheses being
tested using statistical procedures. Impressed by
the spirited attacks by Hans Eysenck (1953,
1957) on psychoanalysis and other nonempirical
schools of psychology, Uta decided that the place
to go for further training was the Institute of
Psychiatry (IOP) in London, and she came to do
an internship there in 1964. It was only with hind-
sight that she became aware of just what a pro-
ductive mix of inﬂuences was based at IOP at
that time. Eysenck himself disappointed, being
largely inaccessible, but the infant discipline of
behaviour therapy was creating excitement, with
Jack Rachman, Monty Shapiro, and Reg Beech
all looking for applications of this new approach
to a wide range of disorders. Uta offered her ser-
vices as a “work experience” student and soon
found herself doing statistical analyses for Reg
Beech on a huge clanking calculator, while at the
same time trying desperately to improve her
English, a task that became a great deal easier
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time with Chris Frith. The internship came to
an end, and Uta had packed up and sent her
luggage off to Germany, but events rapidly took
on a life of their own, and she unexpectedly
found herself accepted on the clinical psychology
course at IOP (then a 13-month diploma), and
engaged to Chris Frith. During the clinical
course she ﬁrst encountered cases of “childhood
psychosis” (which we would now term “autistic
disorder”) and was immediately fascinated at the
contrast between the apparently intelligent and
attractive appearance of such children and their
profound level of handicap. She was convinced,
despite the lack of hard evidence and in the
teeth of contemporary psychogenic theories, that
this must be a disorder with a biological basis,
and she started to question the approach of the
behaviour therapists, who would try to treat the
symptoms, such as gaze avoidance, by condition-
ing, without any concern for underlying causes.
Uta was strongly inﬂuenced by the clinical
insights of Michael Rutter and Lorna Wing,
and she started to hunt out literature that might
throw light on the underlying causes of impair-
ment in these strange children. She was drawn
to experimental studies by Neil O’Connor and
Beate (Ati) Hermelin, which were unique at
that time in that they designed studies of devel-
opmental disorders from the perspective of exper-
imental psychology. Having selected one of their
papers for a journal club (O’Connor &
Hermelin, 1959), she was amazed to ﬁnd that
they were based at IOP, in a research unit
housed in Nissen huts in the grounds. Despite
this insalubrious location, they were an undeni-
ably glamorous pair, more like Hollywood celeb-
rities than psychology researchers, and it took all
of Uta’s courage to approach them. Uta recounts
that her recollection of their meeting was that
she was overawed and reverential in their pre-
sence, but Ati’s subsequent memory was of this
challenging young woman who picked their
study apart and discussed the ﬂaws with them.
Regardless of the reality, Uta clearly impressed
and was subsequently offered the chance to
study for a doctorate under their supervision, on
the topic of “childhood psychosis”. She success-
fully applied for funding from the Deutscher
Akademischer Austausch Dienst and embarked
on her studies, only to ﬁnd, three months into
the doctorate, that she did not meet the
University of London’s eligibility criteria because
she did not have a BA. Fortunately the powers
that be had the good sense to ﬁnd a solution by
setting Uta a qualifying exam in psychology,
and at last she was launched as a research
psychologist.
Autism
In the 1960s, the predominant view of autistic dis-
order was that its origins were environmental
rather than biological. It is all too easy to scoff at
such views in the current climate, when genetic
and neurobiological accounts of autism are com-
monplace and widely accepted, but in the light
of the evidence they seemed reasonable. For a
start, a genetic basis to autism did not seem plaus-
ible because the condition did not appear to run in
families; there was no evidence of parent-to-child
transmission, and it was unusual for more than one
child in a family to be affected. Second, there was
no indication of any gross neurological damage,
and the children looked remarkably normal in
physical appearance; unlike many other children
of low IQ, their demeanour often suggested high
intelligence, giving an impression that there were
true abilities locked away beneath the surface.
Furthermore, experienced clinicians noted certain
deﬁciencies of social interaction in some parents
of children with autism. Taken together, a
logical conclusion was that autism was the result
of a failure of the child to bond adequately with
a parent, leading to a severe disturbance in social
interaction. It has to be said that we are still a
long way from understanding the neurobiological
basis of autism: even with modern imaging tech-
niques it is difﬁcult to detect consistent abnormal-
ities in the brains of children with autism, and the
most plausible accounts, in terms of abnormal con-
nectivity and/or deﬁcient neurotransmitters, still
lack strong evidence. Nevertheless, what has
become clear is that this is a disorder with a
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acceptance of this idea with a twin study by
Folstein and Rutter (1977) and was strengthened
by subsequent studies showing an increased inci-
dence of milder “autistic-like” features in relatives
of affected children (see Rutter, 2000, for a histori-
cal review). Nowadays it is accepted that social
oddities do characterize a subset of parents of chil-
dren with autism, but this is seen as evidence for a
shared genetically determined trait in parent and
child rather than as an indication of a psychogenic
origin to autism. In the 1960s, however, when Uta
started to work on autism, only a minority of
experts were prepared to countenance the idea
that it might be an “organic” condition, and she
freely admits that her own conviction that we
should look for brain bases rather than family
origins was based more on hunch than on evi-
dence. Fortunately, she found herself in an
environment where there was sympathy for this
hunch, and she was encouraged to do studies of
basic perceptual and cognitive processes that
might give a clue as to what distinguished these
children from others. It is important to realize
that autism research in the 1960s and 1970s was
a very different enterprise from how it is today.
The concept of “high-functioning autism” was
not recognized, and the children who were the
topic of study had severe cognitive limitations.
Some lived in institutions, and others attended
the handful of schools that specialized in educating
such children, in particular the Sybil Elgar School
in West London, which had been opened by the
National Autistic Society in 1965. Doing exper-
iments with such children required both stamina
and ingenuity, and Uta addressed the difﬁcult
problem of devising tasks that would exploit the
special interests and cognitive peaks of children
with autism. Initially she learned by implementing
studies devised by Ati Hermelin: these exper-
iments, included in the classic text Psychological
experiments with austistic children (Hermelin &
O’Connor, 1970) were concerned with the extent
to which children’s ability to remember verbal or
nonverbal material was inﬂuenced by meaning.
The comparison group were younger children
who were matched on memory span: the result,
seen for both verbal and nonverbal material, was
that meaning improved recall for both groups,
but its effect was far stronger in the typically devel-
oping controls than in the children with autism.
This demonstration of a distinctive cognitive
proﬁle strengthened Uta’s conviction that we
were dealing with a neurological impairment
rather than a social inhibition caused by poor
parenting. She went on to devise her own
experiment, which considered whether children
with autism were able to take account of a stress
pattern when remembering words. This could be
investigated in two ways: ﬁrst, did children
remember more words when a sequence had
prosodic structure; second, did they impose a
natural prosodic structure on sequences that were
presented with no stress? It was found that chil-
dren with autism took less notice of prosody
than did control children (Aurnhammer-Frith,
1969). This led on to work on pattern processing
in language and in vision, including an ingenious
study of pattern production that may be
regarded as the ﬁrst ever study demonstrating
that children with autism had a deﬁcit in genera-
tivity (the ability to generate ideas—the inverse
of rigidity) (Frith, 1971a).
Throughout her doctoral studies, Uta beneﬁted
from the wholehearted support of Ati Hermelin
and Neil O’Connor, and from them she learned
the skill of designing elegantly simple experiments
that illuminated the nature of underlying cognitive
deﬁcits. Once her PhD was completed, they
offered her a post at their new Medical Research
Council (MRC) Developmental Psychology Unit
in central London; however, it was clear that she
was now expected to develop a new line of research
and so, rather than building on the work she had
done on autism, she embarked on a series of
studies of literacy development. It was only after
Neil O’Connor’s retirement, when John Morton
took over as director of the re-named MRC
Cognitive Development Unit in 1982, that Uta
returned to studies of autism. Although by this
time a more neuropsychological and biological
approach to autism was gaining acceptance, in
large part due to the inﬂuence of Uta’s mentors
at the IOP, Lorna Wing and Michael Rutter,
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that there was a genetic component to the dis-
order. A remarkable development was the publi-
cation of a book entitled Autistic children: New
hope for a cure by the Nobel laureate Niko
Tinbergen and his wife Elisabeth (Tinbergen &
Tinbergen, 1983). Tinbergen’s reputation was
founded on ethological work, and he had the
highly original idea that the same observational
methods that he had applied to the study of
birds could throw light on the problems of chil-
dren with autism. Unfortunately, his ingenious
interpretations of autistic behaviour, and his con-
sequent recommendation of “holding therapy” as
a cure, were highly impressionistic and completely
lacking in scientiﬁc rigour. This therapy involves
parents in holding their child for prolonged
periods, even if the child is resisting the embrace.
The parent tries to establish eye contact and to
share feeling with the child throughout the
session. Uta wrote a scathing review of the book,
but it continued to have a signiﬁcant impact,
with holding therapy continuing to be advocated
as a treatment in Continental Europe as well as
in the United Kingdom.
There followed a remarkably productive period
of research on distinctive cognitive deﬁcits in chil-
dren with autism, fostered by the unique intellec-
tual atmosphere of the Cognitive Development
Unit, where John Morton encouraged his staff to
question and debate both theory and experiments.
During the early 1980s Uta’s research students,
Simon Baron-Cohen, Tony Attwood, and
Amitta Shah, all made important new discoveries
about autism.
Simon Baron-Cohen’s inﬂuential doctoral
studies (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985)
were stimulated in part by Premack and
Woodruff’s (1978) work on chimpanzee cognition,
in which the term “Theory of Mind” was ﬁrst used
to refer to the cognitive capacity to understand
that others may have beliefs, desires, or intentions
that differ from one’s own. Uta recognized that
this had potential relevance for studies of autism,
and that Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) studies of
false belief in children provided an ideal paradigm
for investigating Theory of Mind in this
population. The basic Sally-Anne task seemed so
easy that Uta did not anticipate that children
with autism would have any problem in respond-
ing correctly, and she was amazed when this task
proved such a sensitive tool for revealing the
underlying deﬁcits in social cognition. Alan
Leslie joined the collaboration working on this
topic, providing a theoretical viewpoint that
regarded Theory of Mind as a subset of
more general metarepresentational knowledge.
Throughout this period, the group beneﬁted
from John Morton’s insistence that it was not
enough just to describe what had been found: it
was important to place it in a theoretical context
that would allow for the development of new pre-
dictions that could be tested experimentally. It is
not exaggerating to say that the Theory of Mind
work transformed the conceptualization of
autism by psychologists. Prior to this work,
psychological studies on autism were not very
coherent. The earlier studies on perceptual pro-
cesses and pattern perception by Frith and others
were clearly important, but it was difﬁcult to
relate these ﬁndings to the symptoms of the dis-
order, especially the core social impairments. In
the United Kingdom, much theoretical debate
had focused on the question of whether autism
could be explained as a language disorder (e.g.,
Churchill, 1978), and new insights had been
gained by explicit comparisons of children with
autism and those with receptive language disorders
(Bartak, Rutter, & Cox, 1975), but the core fea-
tures of social impairment remained unexplained.
In the United States, Marian Sigman, Peter
Mundy and their collaborators were doing detailed
observational studies of social interaction in
children with autism, noting deﬁciencies in
shared attention and nonverbal communication
(Sigman, Mundy, Sherman, & Ungerer, 1986).
The Theory of Mind work provided a way of con-
ceptualizing social impairment as stemming from a
cognitive failure in a system that computes rep-
resentations of other minds and their contents. It
not only made theoretical sense; it also provided
new avenues for thinking about intervention, and
many people working in special education found
it helped them to understand why a child with
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ations. The fact that Theory of Mind could be
assessed using a relatively simple experimental
task must also have played a part in the enormous
volume of research stimulated by the 1985 paper.
This included fruitful collaborative studies with
Josef Perner, who had hitherto worked solely on
typical development, but who continued to
develop new ways of looking at Theory of Mind,
including the now-famous Smarties task (Perner,
Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989).
Tony Attwood was a part-time graduate
student who also worked as a clinical psychologist.
Previous studies had suggested that children with
autism made deﬁcient use of gestures: Attwood’s
studies showed that this was an oversimpliﬁcation,
and that the function of gestures was key. His
ﬁndings related neatly to the Theory of Mind the-
orizing, showing that instrumental gestures, which
do not require any interpersonal understanding,
were intact, whereas expressive gestures, which
serve a purely communicative function, were
never observed in children with autism
(Attwood, Frith, & Hermelin, 1988).
Amitta Shah’s work was distinctively different.
She focused on the unusually good performance on
embedded ﬁgures and block design tasks in chil-
dren with autism (Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993).
Interest in strengths as well as weaknesses in the
cognitive proﬁle of autism was a distinctive
aspect of work at the Cognitive Development
Unit, and was key to the development of the
theory of weak central coherence.
In parallel with these exciting developments on
the cognitive front, there was a gradual broadening
of the concept of autism. An epidemiological study
by Lorna Wing and Judith Gould had already
drawn attention to the existence of a large
number of children with social abnormalities
who did not have classic Kanner syndrome but
nevertheless shared many features with these
cases (Wing & Gould, 1979). A subsequent
report noted that although most children with
these characteristics were mentally retarded, this
was not true for all (Wing, 1981a). At the same
time, Asperger’s report of a syndrome akin to
autism but accompanied by relatively good
language skills was summarized in English
(Wing, 1981b), starting a lively debate as to
whether this should be regarded as a subtype of
autism or a distinct disorder. Meanwhile, as
described above, genetic and family studies by
Michael Rutter and associates were forcing
researchers to the conclusion that there was a spec-
trum of autism, ranging from classic Kanner syn-
drome at one extreme to a broader phenotype at
the other extreme, where the affected individual
might function normally in society but have mild
abnormalities of social interaction or communi-
cation. This was the start of a change in the
nature of research on autism. Hitherto, cognitive
studies had focused on children with intellectual
retardation; gradually, as the concept of autism
broadened, researchers turned more and more to
the so-called high-functioning cases, who were
far easier to work with and who, it was hoped,
might throw autism-speciﬁc deﬁcits into much
sharper focus. Uta translated Asperger’s text in
1991, and subsequently she became one of the
world’s experts in this syndrome.
One graduate student who took advantage of
the broadened concept of autism to study cases
of high-functioning autism and Asperger syn-
drome was Francesca Happe ´, who arrived at the
Cognitive Development Unit in the late 1980s.
Language in autism had always interested Uta,
and she could see that investigation of the
relationship between language and Theory of
Mind would be a fruitful topic for study. Happe ´
(1991) used Sperber and Wilson’s (1986)
Relevance Theory to generate predictions about
how children with autism would interpret non-
literal language and found an impressive ﬁt
between theory and data. For Uta, the puzzle of
language in autism made sense if one recognized
that the core deﬁcits were pragmatic failures in
the appreciation of relevance, with other aspects
of language impairment (e.g. in structural aspects
such as grammar and phonology) being correlates
of the condition rather than key features (Frith,
1989b).
In 1989 Autism: Explaining the enigma, Uta’s
synthesis of more than two decades of work on
cognitive bases of this disorder (Frith, 1989a),
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neurobiological disorder and presented compelling
evidence for Theory of Mind as a core area of
deﬁcit, but she also drew attention to the a new
idea concerning Weak Central Coherence as
another aspect of the autistic mind. Unusually
for an academic text, this was written in a clear,
informal, and engaging style and accompanied by
charming illustrations, and it immediately
became a best-seller, with translations into numer-
ous other languages.
Francesca Happe ´ stayed on at the Cognitive
Development Unit after completing her doctorate,
and she and Uta worked together to consider how
Weak Central Coherence related to other aspects
of autistic cognition, including strengths in
certain aspects of memory and perception as well
as deﬁcits in the ability to use context. This culmi-
nated in a detailed exposition of the Weak Central
Coherence account by Frith and Happe ´ in
Cognition in 1994 (see also Happe ´ & Frith,
2006, for an update of the theory).
The mid 1990s saw another major development
that was to fundamentally change the course of
Uta’s research: the development of functional
brain imaging. The earliest studies were done
using the positon-emission tomography (PET)
system at the MRC Cyclotron Unit at the
Hammersmith Hospital, where Chris Frith was
involved in developing activation paradigms
using this new technology. Initially PET was
used to probe the neural basis of Theory of
Mind in normal adults (Fletcher et al., 1995); sub-
sequently the same paradigm was applied to adults
with Asperger syndrome, who showed a speciﬁc
decrease of activation in the medial prefrontal
cortex, which was the region activated by Theory
of Mind tasks in control participants (Happe ´
et al., 1996). Work on brain imaging gathered
pace with the development of imaging facilities
in central London at the Wellcome Department
of Cognitive Neurology, where Chris Frith and
his colleagues pioneered methods for analyzing
brain activation in both PET and functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigms.
Studies using fMRI provided yet more evidence
for involvement of the medial frontal lobes in
Theory of Mind (Gallagher, Frith, & Snowling,
2000).
Chris Frith has always been a major inﬂuence in
Uta’s academic life, right from the earliest days at
the IOP, when he helped her through her
struggles with English language and culture.
During 1970s and 1980s Uta and Chris would
always discuss ideas and read one another’s
papers, but it was in the 1990s that their research
collaboration really took off, as the new imaging
techniques became increasingly important. In
more recent years, their work has moved in a
new and fruitful direction, with the integration
of neuropsychological work on autism and schizo-
phrenia. Both disorders involve abnormalities in
social cognition as well as executive function
impairments, but whereas people with autism
under-utilize Theory of Mind, it appears that
Theory of Mind is overactive in those with para-
noid–schizophrenic symptoms, who see meaning
and communication in situations where it is not
intended. The cross-fertilization between research
on these two disorders has led to innovative theor-
etical approaches to both autism and schizo-
phrenia, engendering a line of work that
promises to be enormously productive over the
next few years.
Dyslexia
Uta’s interest in causes of variation in children’s
reading goes right back to her undergraduate
time in Saarbru ¨cken, when she did a project on
visuoperceptual skills and literacy development.
Marianne Frostig’s ideas on perceptuo-motor
causes of learning disabilities were inﬂuential at
the time (see: http://www.frostig-gesellschaft.
de/M_Fro_EN.htm), and Uta’s project involved
training children to draw a line between two
guidelines that got increasingly close together, to
see how this related to literacy. The challenge of
such a project in the pre-photocopier era should
not be underestimated: To generate response
forms, Uta needed to use a stylus to scratch out a
template onto a special wax-impregnated paper,
which could then be put through a special rotary
printing press. She used this not only to make
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“storyline” for what was otherwise a very boring
task. The results were not conclusive, but Uta
was interested to note that some children reversed
letters, reading “b” as “d” and vice versa. She fol-
lowed up this observation in her dissertation at
IOP and subsequently picked it up again in her
earliest papers on reading in the early 1970s
(Frith, 1971b, 1974).
During the 1970s, three things happened that
led Uta to radically rethink her views on dyslexia.
First, during the summer of 1974, she made her
ﬁrst foray to the United States, spending a
month at the University of Delaware, participating
in an Institute on Reading and Child
Development, sponsored by the Society for
Research in Child Development. Around 30 post-
grads and junior scientists took part, all living in a
dorm on campus, and every few days new
lecturers—including Lila Gleitman, Isabelle
Liberman and Donald Shankweiler—would
descend to give an intensive introduction to their
own research. This experience led Uta to shift
from regarding dyslexia as a disorder of visual
perception to appreciate the important role of
linguistic, especially phonological, processing.
The second factor was Uta’s discovery of the
extent to which reading and spelling could be dis-
sociated in dyslexia. Particularly in older and
brighter individuals, one could ﬁnd cases where
spelling problems persisted in a person who
could read adequately. Uta became intrigued by
this imbalance in skills, which led her to reﬂect
on the different types of cognitive process involved
in word recognition and written production. This
led to her editing an inﬂuential book on this
topic (Frith, 1980). This was very different from
previous educational texts on spelling, because it
brought together perspectives from cognitive
neuropsychology, linguistics, and developmental
psychology. The cognitive neuropsychology
perspective was only just beginning to be applied
to children, with the recognition that by studying
cognitive development in atypical populations one
could throw light on normal developmental
processes. Chapters by Uta’s colleagues Rick
Cromer and Barbara Dodd, on spelling in
language-impaired and hearing-impaired chil-
dren, respectively, exempliﬁed this approach.
The third major inﬂuence on Uta’s thinking
was Maggie Snowling, who started her graduate
studies at the Cognitive Development Unit in
1976. Maggie already had an intense interest in
dyslexia, a problem that affected members of her
immediate family, and she sought out Beve ´
Hornsby, who had founded the Hornsby
International Dyslexia Centre in London and
was developing pioneering new approaches to
intervention (Hornsby & Miles, 1980). This gave
Maggie experience of assessing and teaching chil-
dren with severe and selective reading difﬁculties,
who provided ample evidence of the importance
of phonological processing problems in leading
to literacy impairments. Her thesis studies built
on the foundations set by the original Hermelin
and O’Connor work: carefully designed small-
scale studies in which performance of a disordered
group was compared with that of younger children
matched on performance on a key measure—in
this case, reading level. This led to one of the ear-
liest demonstrations that dyslexic children were
poor even relative to reading-age matched controls
on tasks involving phonological processing, even
when no written language was involved
(Snowling, 1981). Subsequently, Uta and Maggie
carried out a study explicitly comparing reading
skills in autism and dyslexia, showing that
whereas processing of meaning was disrupted in
the former group, processing of sounds was
impaired in the latter (Frith & Snowling, 1983).
One of the things that made John Morton a
remarkable director of the Cognitive
Development Unit was the fact that he did not
start out as a developmental psychologist: his
background was in mainstream experimental psy-
chology. The inﬂuence of this background, with
its insistence on articulation of a clear theoretical
framework, had a marked impact on his colleagues
and students at the Unit. It also meant that John
continued to move easily between the worlds of
adult and child psychology, and encouraged inter-
actions between the two domains. Thus it came to
pass that Uta found herself participating in a
meeting on Surface Dyslexia, a topic of
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working on acquired dyslexias, which generated a
book in which she was encouraged to lay out a
theoretical position specifying how developmental
dyslexia related to normal stages of reading devel-
opment (Frith, 1985). This contrasted with
models of reading development adapted from
adult neuropsychology that attempted to describe
possible processes causing change in behaviour.
The model led to increasing international recog-
nition of her work on reading, with an invitation
to participate in a meeting of the prestigious
Orton Society (Frith, 1986).
For the next few years, work on dyslexia took a
back seat, as Uta again turned to concentrate on
autism, where such remarkable progress was
being made. However, the advent of brain
imaging led to an opportunity to work on one of
the ﬁrst PET studies of dyslexia, in collaboration
with Eraldo Paulesu, an Italian neurologist who
was working at the Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology with Chris Frith. The
crucial insight that stimulated these studies was
that dyslexia was not just a childhood disorder: it
persisted into adulthood, with residual signs
being detectable even in those who appeared to
have compensated for their difﬁculties. Maggie
Snowling’s long-term follow-ups of cases she had
seen in childhood emphasized this point, and
with her help it was possible to recruit adults
who had been studied as dyslexic children. They
showed a distinctive pattern of brain activation
during phonological tasks, in which the normal
connectivity between posterior and anterior areas
appeared to be abolished (Paulesu et al., 1996).
Two other lines of work were started in the late
1990s: high-risk and crosslinguistic studies. The
high-risk study, done in collaboration with
Alison Gallagher and Maggie Snowling, capita-
lized on the evidence that dyslexia was a strongly
genetic disorder, by selecting 3-year-olds whose
parents had dyslexia, so that they could be
studied before they were introduced to reading.
Literacy impairment at 6 years was substantially
more frequent in the at-risk than the control
group and was associated with early language def-
icits, conﬁrming the view that the problems of
children with dyslexia encompass oral as well as
written language (Gallagher, Frith, & Snowling,
2000). Maggie Snowling tells us more about the
later phases of this study in her chapter in this
volume (Snowling, 2008).
Cross-linguisticstudiesprovideaparticularlyrich
testbed for theories of reading disability, because
they enable one to test predictions about the mani-
festations of dyslexia in languages that have different
relationships between orthography and phonology.
One set of studies arose from Uta’s collaborations
with Heinz Wimmer. Originally, they had worked
together on Theory of Mind, but Wimmer was
looking for something new, and comparisons of
reading development in German and English was
a topic that had not previously been adequately
addressed. There followed a series of studies by
Wimmer and his colleague Karin Landerl that
emphasized the dangers of relying solely on one
l a n g u a g e ,E n g l i s h ,w h e nd e v e l o p i n gat h e o r yo fd y s -
lexia. Although there were many similarities
between proﬁles of dyslexia in the two languages
(Landerl, Wimmer, & Frith, 1997), the German-
speaking children also posed problems for the
theory that dyslexia was primarily a disorder of
phoneme awareness (Landerl & Wimmer, 2000).
The other opportunity for cross-linguistic study
arose from the collaboration with Eraldo Paulesu.
Uta was able to obtain EU funds for a PET study
of dyslexia in English, French, and Italian, three
languages that contrasted considerably in the regu-
larity of their orthography. This showed that,
despite different levels of behavioural impairment,
reduced activity in the same region of the left
hemisphere was seen in dyslexics from all three
countries. As the title of the paper aptly put it,
there appeared to be a biological unity underlying
the cultural diversity due to different orthogra-
phies (Paulesu et al., 2001). These same partici-
pants continue to be studied using new methods
of imaging, with a recent voxel-based morphome-
try, ﬁnding altered density of grey and white
matter of speciﬁc left hemisphere regions, and
altered connectivity between regions (Silani
et al., 2005).
The work on dyslexia nicely illustrates how Uta
has succeeded in integrating different levels of
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behavioural—in her model of this disorder. Her
theoretical approach has sharpened our thinking
about causal pathways, and to recognize that we
will only gain a full understanding if we take a cog-
nitive neurobiological perspective (Frith, 1997).
Conclusion
Uta describes herself as someone whose early aca-
demic career was characterized by enormous good
fortune: ﬁrst, the fact that, by chance, she found
herself at one of the few universities in Germany
that taught experimental psychology and provided
her with the opportunity to attend lectures in a
subject far removed from her major discipline;
second, her arrival at the IOP at a time when it
was alive with iconoclastic young scientists who
favoured empiricism and neurobiology over tra-
ditional psychoanalytic approaches; third, the
chance drop-out of a potential student that
allowed her to obtain a diploma in clinical psychol-
ogy; and, fourth, the sequence of events that led
her to be taken on as a PhD student by
Hermelin and O’Connor, whose unique exper-
imental approach was combined with a remarkable
generosity of spirit towards their new student. The
marital and academic partnership with Chris Frith
has been the strongest formative inﬂuence on Uta’s
career and would never have happened had she not
crept away from her art history lectures to ﬁnd out
what this psychology stuff was all about. It is intri-
guing to wonder what Uta would be doing now
had any one of these events not occurred. One
thing that is certain, however, is that Uta’s
success is not due simply to serendipity. She bene-
ﬁted from the opportunities provided because she
matched them with her keen scientiﬁc interest
and a talent for social communication that made
her an excellent student, supervisor, and collabor-
ator. For Uta, a theory was an important step in
the process of hypothesis formation, and the goal
was to test it rigorously rather than to shore it up
at all costs. Her talent for devising simple, child-
friendly experiments that cut to the heart of a
question remains unsurpassed. Uta was indeed for-
tunate to have regular contact with so many
talented and original academic inﬂuences, but
she must also be credited for being someone who
could extract the maximum from these, being
ready to listen, debate, and learn wherever new
ideas were being discussed. As well as the many
distinguished academics whom she credits with
inﬂuencing her work, she also pays tribute to the
parents of children with autism and dyslexia,
whose insights into their children’s cognition
have provided a rich source of ideas.
This chapter has barely been able to scratch the
surface concerning Uta’s own work and the forma-
tive inﬂuences on it. In the remainder of this book
we will hear from her students and collaborators,
who will amply demonstrate the important inﬂu-
ence she has had on subsequent generations of
researchers.
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